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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This habeas corpus case is before us for the third time. 
Twenty years ago, petitioner Larry Gene Hull was convicted 
of first-degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. For the past thirteen years, 
Hull has sought to have that conviction overturned on the 
ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at 
a pretrial competency hearing. Although the state courts 
have rejected his ineffectiveness claim, we have held that 
his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
See Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1991) 
["Hull I"]. However, we have also held that Hull procedurally 
defaulted this claim. See Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 90 
(3d Cir. 1993) ["Hull II"]. The primary issues in the present 
appeal are whether the Pennsylvania courts have waived 
Hull's procedural default, and whether, if they have, he has 
demonstrated that his counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
Pennsylvania courts have waived Hull's procedural default 
and that he thus may bring his claim in federal court. We 
also conclude that Hull was prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to present any of the numerous pieces of available 
evidence regarding his competency or to challenge the 
government's single witness at his short competency 
hearing. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
District Court and remand the case with directions to issue 
a writ of habeas corpus conditioned on Hull's being retried 
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by the Commonwealth. Of course, before new criminal 
proceedings may be commenced against Hull, the 
Pennsylvania courts must determine that he has regained 
his competency to be tried. 
 
I. Procedural History 
 
The procedural history of this case is long and 
convoluted. We recite it in detail, given its importance to 
the first issue before us--procedural default. 
 
A. The Initial State Proceedings 
 
On February 26, 1975, Hull was charged with murder in 
Franklin County, Pennsylvania. On March 7, 1975, he was 
found incompetent to stand trial by the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas. At that time, a defendant who 
asserted his incompetence to stand trial in Pennsylvania 
was required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was incompetent. See Commonwealth v. 
Kennedy, 305 A.2d 890, 892 (Pa. 1973). Hull was 
committed to Farview State Hospital until a second 
competency hearing was held on July 31, 1979. By that 
time, the state legislature had altered the burden for a 
defendant asserting his incompetency to proof by"clear and 
convincing evidence." See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, S 7403(a) 
(West Supp. 1996), amended by Act of July 2, 1996, No. 
77, S 2, 1996 Pa. Laws 481, 482 (requiring proof by a 
preponderance). However, as Hull had already been found 
incompetent in 1975, the burden to prove that he had 
regained his competency was most likely on the 
Commonwealth. See id. S 7403(e) (West Supp. 1999) 
(providing that, after an initial finding of incompetency, 
criminal proceedings will resume only "[w]hen the court . . . 
determines that such person has regained his competence 
to proceed"). 
 
At the July 31, 1979, competency hearing, the 
government presented a single witness, Dr. Harry C. 
Stamey, a court-appointed psychiatrist who had examined 
Hull. Dr. Stamey was asked only eleven questions. The first 
nine were preliminary questions regarding Dr. Stamey's 
background, qualifications, and the foundation for his 
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opinion. He was then asked what his opinion was"as to 
whether Mr. Hull would be able to understand the nature 
or object of the proceedings against him." App. at 422. He 
answered, "I feel that he could." Id. at 423. The final 
question posed to Dr. Stamey asked his opinion "as to 
whether or not Mr. Hull would be able to participate and 
assist in his defense." Id. He answered, "At that time I felt 
that he could do so." Id. Presumably, "that time" referred to 
the date of his examination of Hull, April 20, 1979, more 
than three months before the competency hearing. Then, 
when the court asked Hull's counsel to cross-examine Dr. 
Stamey, he responded, "We have no questions, Your 
Honor." Id. 
 
The record does not disclose if the state court considered 
the report that Dr. Stamey had produced, although the 
doctor sent it to the court about three months before the 
hearing. See id. at 441. As we discuss in more detail infra 
Part IV.D.1, eight different doctors at Farview had found 
Hull mentally ill and incompetent on numerous occasions 
leading up to the competency hearing. Hull's counsel did 
not present any evidence from these examinations nor did 
he call any of these doctors as witnesses on Hull's behalf. 
Nor did his counsel argue to the trial court that Hull was 
incompetent, despite the prior finding of incompetence in 
1975 and the strong evidence in this regard. 
 
At the conclusion of the short competency hearing, and 
with the consent of Hull's counsel, the court found Hull 
competent to stand trial. On August 3, 1979, Hull entered 
a general guilty plea to murder. Following a degree-of-guilt 
hearing, the trial court found Hull guilty of first-degree 
murder and imposed a life sentence. Hull appealed his 
conviction, claiming that he could not be guilty offirst- 
degree murder because "he was intoxicated and acting 
under the influence of a mental illness at the time of the 
shooting." Commonwealth v. Hull, 435 A.2d 1204, 1204 (Pa. 
1981). In a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected his appeal. 
 
B. The Initial State Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
Hull filed a premature state post-conviction petition in 
January 1981. Following the denial of his motion for 
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modification of his sentence, he filed a new state post- 
conviction petition, on July 18, 1986. This petition was 
consolidated with his prior, premature petition. Hull raised 
four issues in his state petition, including the one he 
presses in the current habeas petition--that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to contest the 
issue of his competency to stand trial in 1979. On February 
22, 1988, following two days of hearings in July and 
November of 1987, the Court of Common Pleas rejected all 
of the claims in Hull's post-conviction petition. See 
Commonwealth v. Hull, Crim. No. 101-1975 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 1988). Hull's appeal to Pennsylvania Superior 
Court from the denial of post-conviction relief raised only a 
single issue, the current ineffectiveness claim. On 
September 30, 1988, the Superior Court affirmed the denial 
of relief on this claim. See Commonwealth v. Hull, No. 215 
Harr. 1988 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1988). 
 
The Superior Court was the last state court to reach the 
merits of Hull's ineffective-assistance claim. In rejecting this 
claim, the court "reviewed the colloquy which followed the 
guilty plea and [was] impressed with appellant's ability to 
recount in detail his actions and emotions at the time of 
the murder." Id., slip op. at 3-4. The court held that this 
"ability" demonstrated that Hull was able to assist his 
counsel and to understand the proceedings against him, 
making his ineffectiveness claim meritless. See id. at 4. The 
court added that Hull's trial counsel testified that he failed 
to cross-examine the government's witness or to offer 
independent evidence of Hull's incompetence because of 
"the findings of the court-appointed psychiatrist, his own 
observation of appellant, and appellant's expressed wish to 
be found competent and enter a guilty plea"--and the court 
held that this constituted a reasonable basis for counsel's 
actions. Id. The court did not directly address the single 
substantive issue before us, i.e., whether Hull was 
prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. 
 
Following issuance of the Superior Court order, Hull's 
counsel failed to timely file a petition for allowance of 
appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1 When he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The petition for allowance of appeal is sometimes referred to as a 
petition for allocatur. We use the terms interchangeably. 
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learned of his counsel's actions (or lack thereof), Hull filed 
a pro se petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Hull's petition, without 
comment, on February 21, 1989. See Commonwealth v. 
Hull, No. 4 M.D. Misc. Dkt. 1989 (Pa. Feb. 21, 1989). 
 
C. The Initial Federal Habeas Petition 
 
On May 8, 1989, Hull filed a pro se petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. He raised a 
number of issues, including the ineffective-assistance 
claim. Following appointment of counsel and a magistrate 
judge's initial report and recommendations on the other 
(non-competency related) issues, the district court 
remanded for consideration of the ineffectiveness/ 
competency claim. The magistrate judge found that Hull 
had exhausted his state remedies, but that the claim did 
not have merit. Hull filed objections to the magistrate 
judge's report, and on July 13, 1990, the district court 
(following de novo review) held that Hull had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the 1979 competency 
hearing. The district court issued an order on September 
11, 1990, granting Hull the writ of habeas corpus, and 
remanding the case to the state trial court for a hearing to 
determine Hull's competency to stand trial as of 1979. The 
Commonwealth timely appealed this ruling. 
 
In Hull I, we reviewed essentially the same two issues 
before us now: whether Hull's ineffectiveness claim was 
procedurally defaulted, and (if it was not) whether he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 1979 
competency hearing. First, we held that Hull's failure to file 
a timely petition for allowance of appeal from the Superior 
Court's 1988 decision did not constitute a procedural 
default: "Absent a clear and express statement that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its denial [of Hull's 
petition for allowance of appeal] on a procedural default (to 
wit, untimeliness), we must assume that the Court denied 
Hull's appeal on the merits." Hull I, 932 F.2d at 167 
(emphasis omitted). 
 
Regarding Hull's substantive claim, we agreed with the 
district court that the first prong of the Strickland 
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ineffectiveness test had been met, as his " `counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.' " Id. at 169 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 688). However, we were unable to discern whether the 
district court had reached the second Strickland prong, i.e., 
that Hull was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient 
performance. We therefore remanded the case to the district 
court for a determination whether Hull had been prejudiced 
by his counsel's failure to cross-examine the government's 
witness or to present a case at the 1979 competency 
hearing. See id. at 170. We also made clear that, if the 
district court found that Hull was prejudiced, the proper 
remedy would not be a state hearing to determine Hull's 
competency as of 1979. Rather, the appropriate remedy 
would be the granting of a writ of habeas corpus 
conditioned on the state retrying Hull after it established 
that he had regained his competency to be tried. 
 
On remand, the district court held two days of hearings, 
in September and October of 1991, on the issue of 
prejudice. On October 18, 1991, the district court issued an 
opinion and order in which it held that the outcome of 
Hull's 1979 competency hearing would not have been 
different if his counsel's performance had not been 
deficient. See Hull v. Freeman, Civ. No. 89-0681 (M.D. Pa. 
Oct. 18, 1991). It therefore denied his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Hull timely appealed to this court. 
 
In Hull II, we declined to reach the merits of Hull's 
ineffectiveness claim because we concluded, contrary to our 
holding in Hull I, that the claim had been procedurally 
defaulted. We reasoned that two U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions handed down less than two months after Hull I 
compelled the finding that "the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's denial without comment of Hull's untimely appeal 
of his state petition was based on procedural default." Hull 
II, 991 F.2d at 90 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722 (1991), and Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)). 
After holding that Hull's claim was procedurally defaulted, 
we noted that he could still bring his claim in federal court 
if he established cause and prejudice for his procedural 
default. The "cause" that Hull put forth was his post- 
conviction counsel's ineffectiveness in failing tofile a timely 
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appeal to the state supreme court, as well as his own 
illiteracy and mental retardation. We rejected these as 
insufficient for establishing "cause" under controlling 
Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 91. However, we held 
that "Hull's mental deficiencies, combined with post- 
conviction counsel's failure to file the appeal and failure to 
notify Hull until after the deadline passed, create a 
colorable claim for waiver [of the procedural default] under 
Pennsylvania law." Id. We therefore remanded the case to 
the district court with directions to dismiss Hull's habeas 
petition without prejudice, so that he could "attempt to 
establish a basis for waiver in state court, after which he 
may obtain federal habeas review if the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court rejects his claim on the merits." Id. at 92. 
 
Because it is important to our analysis of the waiver 
issue, see infra Part III.B, we rescribe our reasoning in Hull 
II regarding Hull's attempt to establish waiver in state 
court: 
 
        Accordingly, we will dismiss Hull's petition without 
       prejudice so he may file a state post-conviction petition 
       to assert his claim of ineffective assistance of post- 
       conviction counsel as a ground for his untimely 
       petition for allocatur on his ineffective assistance of 
       trial counsel claim. If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
       rejects Hull's ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
       counsel claim, we presume it will deny his petition for 
       permission to appeal nunc pro tunc on this basis. It will 
       then have ruled based on procedural default and, 
       under Coleman, Hull will be barred from federal habeas 
       review . . . . 
 
        By contrast, if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
       upholds Hull's ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
       counsel claim, we presume it will grant his petition for 
       permission to appeal nunc pro tunc on his ineffective 
       assistance of trial counsel claim. The court will then 
       either deny or grant Hull's petition for allocatur on his 
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. In either 
       scenario, the court will be considered to have reached 
       the merits of Hull's ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
       claim, and thus to have waived his procedural default 
       with respect to this claim. If the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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       Court grants Hull's petition for allocatur, it will in fact 
       reach the merits of the ineffective assistance of trial 
       counsel claim. If the court denies Hull's petition for 
       allocatur, it will be deemed, under the Ylst "look- 
       through" rule, to have decided the ineffective 
       assistance of trial counsel claim on the same ground as 
       the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which rejected it on 
       the merits. Thus, in either event, Hull will have 
       obtained a determination on the merits of his 
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by the 
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and, necessarily, a ruling 
       by that court that it waived Hull's procedural default of 
       this claim on the ground he received ineffective 
       assistance of post-conviction counsel. 
 
        If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denies Hull's 
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim either by 
       denying allocatur or by granting allocatur and rejecting 
       it on the merits, he may re-file his federal habeas 
       petition. 
 
Id. at 93-94 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). On May 
21, 1993, following our directive, the district court 
dismissed Hull's habeas petition without prejudice. See Hull 
v. Freeman, Civ. No. 89-0681 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 1993). 
 
D. The Second State Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
On March 16, 1995, Hull returned to the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas, and sought leave tofile a 
petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Finding the issue of hisfirst 
post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness "rather 
straightforward," the court granted Hull the relief he 
sought, on August 30, 1995. See Commonwealth v. Hull, 
Crim. No. 101-1975 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Aug. 30, 1995). The 
specific relief granted to Hull was as follows: 
 
       [D]efendant is granted leave to file a petition for appeal 
       nunc pro tunc to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
       from the decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
       dated September 30, 1988, conditioned upon the relief 
       granted herein not being inconsistent with the order of 
       the Supreme Court dated February 21, 1989. 
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Id., slip op. at 7. 
 
On September 28, 1995, the Commonwealth filed a 
notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from 
the Common Pleas Court's order. The following day, the 
Common Pleas Court filed an order directing the 
Commonwealth to serve the court with a statement of the 
matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On October 23, 1995, 
fifty-four days after the Common Pleas Court had issued its 
original order granting Hull the relief he sought, the 
government filed the statement requested by the court. On 
the next day, the Common Pleas Court filed a supplemental 
opinion and order, denying Hull his requested relief, which 
it had granted him fifty-five days before. See Commonwealth 
v. Hull, Crim. No. 101-1975 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Oct. 24, 1995). 
 
Hull filed a notice of appeal from the Common Pleas 
Court's second order. This appeal and the Commonwealth's 
appeal of the initial Common Pleas Court order were 
consolidated. The parties stipulated that the 
Commonwealth would be designated the appellant for 
purposes of the appeal. The Commonwealth failed tofile its 
brief before the Superior Court, and on January 23, 1996, 
the Superior Court dismissed the consolidated appeal. See 
Commonwealth v. Hull, Nos. 735 & 848 Harr. 1995 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1996). As far as the present record 
reveals, the Commonwealth did not seek reconsideration of 
this dismissal order nor seek review of the dismissal by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
Meanwhile, on September 20, 1995, on the basis of the 
initial Common Pleas Court order, Hull filed a petition for 
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc to the state supreme 
court, in which he raised the ineffective-assistance claim 
that is before us now. On February 29, 1996, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied without comment 
Hull's petition for allowance of appeal from the Superior 
Court's 1988 decision. See Commonwealth v. Hull, 673 A.2d 
332 (Pa. 1996). 
 
E. The Second Federal Habeas Petition 
 
Hull filed his present petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
on March 6, 1997. After referral, the Magistrate Judge 
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found that Hull's ineffective-assistance claim remained 
procedurally defaulted and that, for the reasons stated in 
the district court's 1991 opinion, Hull had not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
deficient performance at the 1979 competency hearing. On 
October 2, 1997, following Hull's filing of objections (and 
the Commonwealth's failure to file a response), the District 
Court rejected the Magistrate Judge's recommendation 
regarding procedural default, but denied Hull's petition on 
the merits, "for the reasons set forth in [its] opinion and 
order dated October 18, 1991." Hull v. Kyler, No. 4:CV-97- 
353, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1997). Hull filed a timely 
notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291 & 2253. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
Our review of the procedural default issue is plenary. See 
Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 986 (3d Cir. 1993). We 
review the District Court's findings of fact regarding Hull's 
substantive claim for clear error. See Government of V.I. v. 
Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1430 (3d Cir. 1996). In the 
1997 order from which Hull appeals, the District Court 
incorporated the findings of fact from its 1991 order 
denying Hull's initial petition. See Hull v. Kyler, No. 4:CV- 
97-353, slip op. at 7. None of the facts relevant to the 
prejudice issue appear disputed. See Hull v. Freeman, Civ. 
No. 89-0681, slip op. at 3-9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1991). We 
exercise plenary review over the question whether the facts 
found by the District Court demonstrate prejudice under 
Strickland. See Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
III. Procedural Default 
 
A. Background 
 
It is well established that a state prisoner may not seek 
habeas relief in federal court if he has failed to raise the 
alleged error in state court. If state proceedings remain 
available, the claim is not yet exhausted, and the habeas 
petition must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1), (c) 
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(1994 & Supp. II 1996); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518- 
19 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will 
encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the 
state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity 
to review all claims of constitutional error."). If state 
avenues of relief, including post-conviction proceedings, 
have been exhausted, but the petitioner has failed to raise 
the alleged grounds for error, the claim is procedurally 
defaulted and may not be raised in federal court. See 
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 81-87 (1977). 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court made clear that a petitioner 
procedurally defaults a claim if he fails to raise it in a 
discretionary state appeal. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 
S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1999). In Boerckel, the Court 
acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court was not 
obligated to hear an appeal in a criminal case, but relied on 
the fact that it might take such an appeal to hold that 
failure to petition for such review constituted procedural 
default. Therefore, Hull's failure to timely petition the state 
supreme court for allowance of appeal on his ineffectiveness 
claim constitutes procedural default. 
 
A petitioner with a defaulted claim may nonetheless raise 
this claim in federal habeas proceedings if either (1) he can 
demonstrate a valid cause for the default and prejudice 
from the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, see 
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87, or (2) the 
state has waived (or declined to rely on) the procedural 
default, see Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 
255, 262-63 (1989). We have already held that Hull cannot 
meet the first prong of the cause-and-prejudice exception. 
See Hull II, 991 F.2d at 93. Therefore, Hull can only bring 
his current claim in federal court if the Pennsylvania courts 
have waived the procedural default of failing to timely file 
an appeal to the state supreme court from the Superior 
Court's denial of his post-conviction claim. As we outlined 
in detail supra Part I.C, our decision in Hull II gave Hull the 
opportunity to return to state court to seek such a waiver. 
The first question we must answer in this case is whether 
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he obtained this relief in his second trip to state post- 
conviction court.2 
 
B. Waiver of Hull's Procedural Default 
 
1. 
 
We briefly review the relevant events from Hull's two state 
post-conviction proceedings, as these events furnish the 
answer to the initial question. First, on September 30, 
1988, the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Hull's 
ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. Hull's counsel 
then failed to timely file a petition for allowance of appeal 
to the state supreme court. Almost seven years later, Hull 
sought, and received, from the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas leave to file a petition for allowance of 
appeal nunc pro tunc to the state supreme court from the 
Superior Court's 1988 decision. The leave was granted on 
the basis of his post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness in 
failing to timely file such a petition originally or to notify 
Hull of this failure in a timely fashion. See Commonwealth 
v. Hull, Crim. No. 101-1975, slip op. at 5-6 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 
Aug. 30, 1995). This leave to file a nunc pro tunc appeal, 
granted by the state court, constituted a waiver of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Before denying Hull's claim on the merits, the District Court rejected 
the Magistrate Judge's finding that there had been no state waiver of 
Hull's procedural default. The Commonwealth did not appeal this 
decision of the District Court, nor do we believe it could have. See 
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) ("Ordinarily, 
only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may 
exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all 
that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording 
the relief and cannot appeal from it."). However, "[i]t is well accepted . 
. . 
that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely 
upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment 
below." Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982). The 
Commonwealth has raised the procedural-default issue in its brief, and 
we therefore find it appropriate to reach this issue. Cf. Smith v. Horn, 
120 F.3d 400, 408 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the court of appeals may 
raise procedural default sua sponte), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1037 
(1998). 
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procedural default that arose when Hull failed originally to 
timely appeal from the Superior Court's 1988 decision. 
 
If the Commonwealth wished to avoid the state court's 
waiver of the procedural default, it was incumbent upon it 
to appeal this order of the Common Pleas Court. Initially, it 
did so. However, after the Commonwealth failed tofile a 
brief, the Superior Court dismissed its appeal. As a result, 
the Common Pleas Court's (initial) order granting Hull the 
relief he sought, i.e., a waiver of his procedural default so 
that he could file a petition for allowance of appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, remained in effect. Following 
the trial court's granting of this relief, Hull timely filed his 
petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc, seeking 
review of the Superior Court's 1988 decision. The state 
supreme court denied the appeal without comment. 
 
2. 
 
While the Common Pleas Court qualified its order 
granting Hull leave to file his nunc pro tunc petition by 
providing that it was doing so only on the condition that 
the state supreme court not consider such a petition 
untimely, the state supreme court, in silently denying 
Hull's petition, gave no indication that it was invoking this 
"qualifier." It could have done so by either dismissing 
(rather than denying) Hull's second petition, or by clearly 
stating that Hull's petition remained untimely and that his 
procedural default remained effective. It did neither, but 
instead followed the trial court's granting of relief to Hull 
with a denial of his second nunc pro tunc petition, without 
comment. Therefore, we read the state supreme court's 
unexplained denial of Hull's most recent nunc pro tunc 
petition as "a determination on the merits of his ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, and, necessarily, a ruling by that court 
that it waived Hull's procedural default of this claim on the 
ground he received ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel." Hull II, 991 F.2d at 94. 
 
In Hull II, we did not anticipate that Hull would obtain 
the waiver he sought from a lower state court and then be 
unable to have this relief ratified (or overturned) by the 
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state supreme court. We assumed that one of three things 
would happen after Hull returned to state court. First, the 
state supreme court could reject Hull's waiver argument, 
and he would be procedurally barred from bringing his 
federal habeas claim. Second, the state supreme court 
could accept his waiver argument, then grant his petition 
for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc from the 1988 
Superior Court decision, and rule on (and reject) the merits 
of his ineffective-assistance claim, in which case he would 
be able to raise his ineffective-assistance claim in federal 
habeas court. Third, the state supreme court could accept 
his waiver argument, but deny his petition for allowance of 
appeal nunc pro tunc from the Superior Court's decision, in 
which case he also would be able to raise his ineffective- 
assistance claim in federal habeas court. See Hull II, 991 
F.2d at 93-94 & n.6. Because the Commonwealth failed to 
pursue its appeal from the state post-conviction court's 
granting of a waiver of Hull's procedural default, the state 
supreme court never had the formal opportunity, through 
no fault of Hull's, to fulfill one of these three scenarios by 
expressly accepting or rejecting Hull's waiver argument. 
 
The actual course of events in state court was essentially 
that outlined in Hull II's final scenario, i.e., acceptance of 
Hull's waiver argument, and then denial of his petition for 
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc. However, it was the 
state trial court, and not the state supreme court, that 
accepted Hull's waiver argument, after which the state 
supreme court denied the petition for allowance of appeal 
from the Superior Court's 1988 decision. Although we did 
not foresee, in Hull II, a scenario in which Hull's waiver 
claim would never get past the state trial court, Hull only 
needed a waiver from "the Pennsylvania courts," not 
necessarily from the state's highest court. See id. at 93 
("Hull can only obtain federal habeas review if the 
Pennsylvania courts waive his procedural default." 
(emphasis added)); cf. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801 ("State 
procedural bars are not immortal, however; they may expire 
because of later actions by state courts." (emphasis added)). 
Once a lower state court granted Hull a waiver, and the 
Commonwealth failed to appeal from this order (and the 
state supreme court did not indicate that the waiver was 
improperly granted when it denied Hull's petition for 
 
                                15 
  
allowance of appeal), Hull had done what federal law and 
our decision in Hull II required of him. To hold otherwise 
would allow states to circumvent the waiver exception to 
the procedural-default rule by failing to appeal from lower 
state court decisions holding that a procedural default is 
waived. 
 
In short, our holding in Hull II compels the result in the 
present case: We expressly held in Hull II that the state 
courts would be deemed to have waived Hull's procedural 
default if he was given permission to file a petition for 
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc (which he was) and the 
state supreme court then denied that petition (which it did). 
In fact, we held that, "as a matter of federal law," if the 
state supreme court denied Hull's petition for allowance of 
appeal under these circumstances, it would be deemed a 
decision on the merits. See Hull II, 991 F.2d at 94 n.5; see 
also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739 ("It remains the duty of the 
federal courts . . . to determine the scope of the relevant 
state court judgment."). We are of course bound by Hull II 
but, at all events, agree that on these facts when the 
Pennsylvania courts granted Hull the right to file a petition 
for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc, the subsequent 
denial of that petition was on the merits. 
 
3. 
 
Despite the foregoing, the Commonwealth argues that the 
state courts have not waived Hull's procedural default 
because the second post-conviction court issued a 
supplemental opinion and order rejecting Hull's waiver 
argument, fifty-five days after issuing its initial opinion and 
order granting him relief. We agree that, if this is a valid 
order regarding Hull's request for waiver of the procedural 
default, and if he failed to adequately appeal from this 
order, his federal habeas claim remains procedurally 
barred. We reject the Commonwealth's argument, however, 
because once an appeal was filed, state law clearly 
precluded the post-conviction court from issuing a 
"supplemental" order that completely reversed the effects of 
its initial, valid order. 
 
It is settled law in Pennsylvania that the timely filing of 
a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to 
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take any further action in a case. See Pa. R. App. P. 
1701(a). A court may grant reconsideration of its order if an 
application for reconsideration is filed and granted within 
the time provided for filing a notice of appeal (thirty days). 
See Pa. R. App. P. 1701(b)(3). In this case, however, there 
is no indication that the Commonwealth filed (or that the 
trial court granted) such an application for reconsideration 
within thirty days. Therefore, the court had no authority to 
"reconsider" the merits of its initial order. 
 
In issuing its "supplemental" order, the state court in this 
case purported to rely on Pennsylvania Appellate Rule 
1925, which allows a lower court to "enter an order 
directing the appellant to file of record in the lower court 
and serve on the trial judge a concise statement of the 
matters complained of on the appeal." Pa. R. App. P. 
1925(b). The purpose of the rule, as seen most clearly by 
subsection (a), is to allow the lower court to clarify the 
basis of its initial order to ensure meaningful appellate 
review. See Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a) ("Upon receipt of the 
notice of appeal the judge who entered the order appealed 
from, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of 
record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief 
statement, in the form of an opinion, of the reasons for the 
order, or for the rulings or other matters complained of, or 
shall specify in writing the place in the record where such 
reasons may be found."); see also Commonwealth v. Stilley, 
689 A.2d 242, 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Franklin S. Van 
Antwerpen et al., Plugging Leaks in the Dike: A Proposal for 
the Use of Supplemental Opinions in Federal Appeals, 20 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1233, 1235-36 (1999). 
 
Nothing in Rule 1925, which involves only "clarification" 
of lower court orders for the purpose of appeal, gives a trial 
court authority to issue a supplemental opinion in which it 
completely reverses its prior holding, more than thirty days 
after entry of the original order and without an order 
granting reconsideration of the original order. See 
Pennsylvania Indus. Energy Coalition v. Pennsylvania Pub. 
Util. Comm'n, 653 A.2d 1336, 1346 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) 
(holding that a lower tribunal that "made substantive 
changes to its earlier decision" had effectively granted 
reconsideration, not clarification, of that prior decision, and 
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it did not have authority to do so more than thirty days 
after the prior decision was filed), aff'd per curiam, 670 
A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. McMillan, 545 A.2d 
301, 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("[I]t is well-settled that the 
trial court loses all power to alter its orders,final or 
interlocutory, thirty days from entry of judgment of 
sentence unless an order granting reconsideration is 
granted within that thirty day period."), aff'd per curiam, 
567 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1990). 
 
Under Pennsylvania's rules of appellate procedure and its 
unequivocal caselaw, the trial court's "supplemental" 
decision had no effect on this case. Indeed, "it was a 
nullity." Commonwealth v. Hairston, 470 A.2d 1004, 1006 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Once the post-conviction court 
granted Hull the relief he sought and thirty days passed 
without the granting of a motion for reconsideration, the 
trial court's order was final, and was alterable only by a 
state appeals court. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5505 
(West 1981) (permitting modification of a court order 
"within 30 days after its entry . . . if no appeal from such 
order has been taken").3 The Commonwealth abandoned its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of 
"supplemental" orders indirectly. See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, ___ A.2d 
___, No. 66 W.D. 1988, 1999 WL 455695 (Pa. July 7, 1999). In Lantzy, 
a defendant's counsel failed to inform him that a trial court's 
modification of his sentence was a nullity because it was entered more 
than thirty days after imposition of the original sentence and without an 
express grant of reconsideration. See id. at *1. Because the defendant 
withdrew the appeal from his original (and only valid) sentence, and the 
appeal from the modified (invalid) sentence was quashed, he lost any 
opportunity to directly appeal his sentence. See id. The court held that 
the advice (or lack thereof) that led to this scenario constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at *7 ("As counsel lacked a 
reasonable basis for failing to advise Lantzy that the sentence 
modification would be invalid, counsel's representation was deficient."). 
This implies that the state of the law in this area is quite well-settled. 
 
The court additionally noted that it was questionable whether the 
defendant "would have been able to compel the Department of 
Corrections to honor the [modified] order had its validity been 
challenged," citing a case that held that "mandamus does not lie to 
compel the Department of Corrections to honor a facially invalid order." 
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only avenue of relief, however, when it failed tofile a brief 
with the Superior Court. Therefore, the Pennsylvania courts 
definitively waived Hull's procedural default when the order 
granting such relief became final and not subject to further 
appeal.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Id. at *7 n.9 (emphasis added) (citing Fajohn v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 
1067, 1068 (Pa. 1997)). In our view, this recent case confirms that a 
supplemental or modified order, entered more than thirty days after an 
initial order and unaccompanied by an express grant of reconsideration, 
is a "nullity," is "facially invalid," and should be given no effect. 
 
4. The post-conviction court issued its supplemental order reversing its 
prior order because it found that the initial order was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of state law. However, it is not clear that state 
law would have precluded Hull from raising the issue of his trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness in a second post-conviction petition. 
Pennsylvania courts will entertain a post-conviction claim that has been 
waived or that is contained in a second (or later) post-conviction 
petition 
if the petitioner makes "a strong prima facie  showing . . . that a 
miscarriage of justice may have occurred." Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
549 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988). This condition is met when a petitioner is 
actually innocent or when "the proceedings resulting in his conviction 
were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized 
society can tolerate." Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 633 A.2d 1098, 1100 
(Pa. 1993); see also Lawson, 549 A.2d at 112 (Papadakos, J., concurring) 
(defining miscarriage of justice as an error that is "so serious that it 
undermined the reliability of the outcome of the proceeding," as when "a 
conviction can be shown to result from a breakdown in the adversary 
process"). 
 
The Pennsylvania courts, including the state supreme court, have 
frequently considered the merits of petitioners' claims in second post- 
conviction petitions, and have held that no miscarriage of justice 
occurred because the underlying claims had no merit. For example, in 
Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 709 A.2d 849 (Pa. 1998), the state supreme 
court entertained a petitioner's claim, in a second post-conviction 
petition, that "his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise" 
the 
issue of his competency to stand trial. Id. at 860. The court noted that 
"Jermyn points to nothing which occurred during trial . . . to establish 
that he was incompetent to stand trial and that the trial court should 
have held a hearing on that issue." Id. at 862. It then observed that the 
second post-conviction court had "concluded that there was no merit to 
Jermyn's contentions" regarding his competency and had "ruled that 
Jermyn failed to show that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this 
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4. 
 
Finally, we choose to address the facial tension between 
our conclusion today that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's silent denial of Hull's second petition for allowance 
of appeal constituted a decision on the merits and our 
determination in Hull II that the court's silent denial of 
Hull's first petition was based on procedural default. The 
primary basis for our decision in Hull II was the holding by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
regard." Id. It concluded: "We agree with the PCRA court." Id. Chief 
Justice Flaherty dissented, concluding that the failure of Jermyn's 
counsel to raise the incompetency issue was "a miscarriage of justice 
sufficient to warrant PCRA relief." Id. at 871 (Flaherty, C.J., 
dissenting). 
The majority took issue with the Chief Justice's view of the merits, but 
not with his assertion that such ineffectiveness of trial counsel would 
constitute a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 862 n.34. 
 
We view the discussion and holding in Jermyn (and in many similar 
state cases) as implicitly recognizing that a due process claim such as 
Hull's--i.e., that he was convicted of first-degree murder while 
incompetent to stand trial--is potentially one in which "a miscarriage of 
justice occurred which no civilized society can tolerate." As we discuss 
infra Part IV.E, we believe that Hull's underlying claim is meritorious 
and 
that there is a reasonable probability that he was convicted while 
incompetent to stand trial. Therefore, under state law, the post- 
conviction court may have been correct in initially determining that Hull 
was entitled to the relief he sought, which would allow him to raise his 
claim before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Cf. Doctor v. Walters, 96 
F.3d 675, 682 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the Pennsylvania courts 
might find a "miscarriage of justice" occurred, justifying waiver of a 
procedural default, when a trial court "entered a verdict against 
[petitioner] without convening any proceedings in open court and 
without any semblance of resuming adversary proceedings"). 
 
More importantly, as we noted in Hull II,"the concept of federal-state 
comity underlying federal habeas review entitles Hull to a state court 
adjudication of his claim for waiver." Hull II, 991 F.2d at 91. Hull 
sought 
and obtained such an "adjudication of his claim for waiver," and 
prevailed on that claim. The Commonwealth may not now allege error in 
the trial court's initial (and only valid) ruling, from which it failed to 
adequately appeal. When comity compels us to leave adjudication of an 
issue to a state court, see id. at 91-93, it likewise requires us to 
respect 
that court's determination of the issue, despite the losing party's claim 
that the determination was contrary to state law. 
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the Supreme Court in Ylst that an unexplained order of a 
state court upholding a prior judgment of a lower court is 
presumed to be based upon the same ground as that relied 
upon by the lower court. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. If the 
lower court rejected a claim on the merits, a silent denial of 
an appeal is presumed to be on the merits; if the lower 
court relied on a procedural default, an unexplained order 
affirming that judgment is presumed to similarly rely on 
procedural default. Although neither of these situations-- 
which were the central focus of Ylst--accurately described 
Hull's procedural posture, we looked, in Hull II , to the 
Supreme Court's additional observation that the 
presumption could be rebutted in certain situations, such 
as when a lower court reached the merits of a federal claim, 
but the appeal to the higher court "that issued the 
unexplained order was plainly out of time," Ylst, 501 U.S. 
at 804, as was the case here. On the basis of this 
observation in Ylst, we concluded that the state supreme 
court's denial of Hull's first untimely petition was based on 
procedural default. See Hull II, 991 F.2d at 90-91. 
 
The Court in Ylst, however, made clear that "procedural 
bars are not immortal," as "later actions by state courts" 
may lift them. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. While rejecting the 
petitioner's argument in Ylst that his claim was not barred 
because the state courts might waive his procedural 
default, the Court acknowledged that "they could do so," id. 
at 806, but found no evidence that they had. In this case 
(unlike in Ylst), the petitioner did obtain such a waiver of 
his procedural default from the state courts.5 Therefore, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Ylst, the Court explained that a procedural default would be lifted 
if a state court presented with a federal constitutional claim reached the 
merits of that claim after the procedural default had arisen in a lower 
court. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. We acknowledge that the Common 
Pleas Court did not reach the merits of Hull's underlying claim in his 
second post-conviction petition, but only granted Hull leave to file a 
nunc pro tunc appeal to the state supreme court. Ylst, however, does not 
address the precise situation here, as no court expressly rejected Hull's 
claim on the basis of procedural default (as the state courts did in Ylst 
and Coleman). Rather, in Hull II, we interpreted the state supreme 
court's silent denial of Hull's untimely petition as being based on 
procedural default. Because the Common Pleas Court and the Superior 
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Hull II contemplated, Hull obtained a waiver of his 
procedural default, presented his substantive claim to the 
one state court yet to hear that claim (the state supreme 
court), and had the claim rejected. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Pennsylvania has 
waived Hull's procedural default that occurred when he 
failed to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal to the 
state supreme court from the Superior Court's 1988 
decision rejecting his ineffective-assistance claim. We 
therefore turn to the merits of this claim. 
 
IV. Hull's Ineffective-Assistance Claim 
 
A. Applicability of AEDPA 
 
We must initially determine whether the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies to Hull's ineffective 
assistance claim. If it does, our review will be somewhat 
different than theretofore because 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), as 
amended by AEDPA, requires us to give heightened 
deference to state court adjudications of habeas claims. 
Hull argues that AEDPA does not apply to his claim 
because the Supreme Court has held that petitionsfiled 
before AEDPA's enactment on April 24, 1996, are governed 
by the pre-AEDPA version of S 2254, see Lindh v. Murphy, 
521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), and his initial petition was filed 
well before AEDPA's enactment. We disagree. 
 
Hull's initial petition was dismissed without prejudice, 
and it is only his present petition that is relevant for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court had already addressed the merits of Hull's claim, they did not 
need to do so again to excuse his procedural default. 
 
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed how a petitioner 
may have a procedural default such as the present one excused by a 
state court. It has only addressed the issue of"waiver" of procedural 
default when one court has rejected a claim on the basis of procedural 
default, and a higher court later addressed the merits of the claim. This 
is not something Hull could have sought, as no state court explicitly 
rejected his claim on the basis of procedural default, but rather we did 
(in Hull II), based on our reading of Ylst and Coleman. 
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purposes of analyzing his ineffectiveness claim. His present 
petition was filed almost a year after AEDPA's enactment, 
and is therefore governed by the amended S 2254. See In re 
Minarik, 166 F.3d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1999) (interpreting 
Lindh as holding that the post-AEDPA S 2254 applies to 
petitions filed after April 24, 1996); cf. Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 884-85 (3d Cir. 
1999) (en banc) (applying post-AEDPA S 2254(d)(1) to a 
petition filed after AEDPA's enactment, although the 
petitioner had filed a prior, dismissed petition before 1996), 
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3008 (U.S. June 22, 
1999) (No. 98-2050). 
 
Given our holding in Minarik, it is only because Hull filed 
a petition before AEDPA's enactment that he can even 
plausibly argue that his claim is not governed by the 
AEDPA amendments. Yet his pre-AEDPA petition was 
dismissed without prejudice. Typically, when a complaint 
(or habeas petition) is dismissed without prejudice, that 
complaint or petition is treated as if it never existed. See, 
e.g., Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a habeas petition filed after a prior one was 
dismissed without prejudice is considered the petitioner's 
first habeas petition); cf. Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer- 
Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 77 (3d Cir. 1983) ("It is a 
well recognized principle that a statute of limitations is not 
tolled by the filing of a complaint subsequently dismissed 
without prejudice. As regards the statute of limitations, the 
original complaint is treated as if it never existed."). 
Therefore, the fact that Hull filed a prior (since dismissed) 
petition is irrelevant to such issues as the law that applies 
to his present petition. 
 
We recently held, dealing with a cognate issue, that a 
district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing an 
amendment to a S 2255 motion, when the amendment was 
sought after the AEDPA limitations period had run. See 
United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999). 
We reasoned that allowing the amendment would have 
"frustrated the intent of Congress that claims under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 be advanced within one year after a judgment 
of conviction becomes final." Id. If a petitioner cannot 
amend a timely petition after a limitations bar has risen, we 
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think it unlikely that a petitioner could reach back to a 
prior petition to avoid the effect of AEDPA's passage, which 
occurred after the prior petition had been completely 
dismissed and before the current petition had beenfiled. 
 
While applying AEDPA's stricter standard to Hull's claim 
may appear unfair, given his attempt to bring his current 
claim to federal court well before AEDPA's enactment, he 
did not have a cognizable federal habeas claim until 
February 29, 1996, when his procedural default was waived 
and his state post-conviction remedies exhausted. His 
activity before that date, including the filing of a federal 
habeas petition in 1989, is simply irrelevant for purposes of 
determining which law applies to the present claim, 
because it was only after February 29, 1996, that Hull 
could petition a federal court for habeas relief on his 
exhausted and non-defaulted claim. Once AEDPA became 
effective approximately two months later, it governed all 
new habeas petitions filed after that date, including Hull's 
current petition, which was filed on March 6, 1997. 
 
B. Standard of Review (Under AEDPA) 
 
Section 2254(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA, provides: 
 
        An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
       of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
       State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
       claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
       proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the 
       Supreme Court of the United States . . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996). Our recent en banc 
decision in Matteo provides the post AEDPA standard for 
reviewing a claim under S 2254(d)(1). Under Matteo, a 
habeas writ should not be granted "unless the state court 
decision, evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted 
in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under 
existing Supreme Court precedent." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 
890. We noted in Matteo that Congress clearly intended 
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federal habeas courts to defer to reasonable state court 
adjudications of prisoners' claims: "Congress intended to 
restrict habeas relief to cases in which the state court 
judgment rested upon an objectively flawed interpretation 
of Supreme Court precedent." Id. We also held in Matteo 
that "federal habeas courts are [not] precluded from 
considering the decisions of the inferior federal courts when 
evaluating whether the state court's application of the law 
was reasonable." Id. With this standard in mind, we 
proceed to the merits of Hull's ineffective-assistance claim. 
 
C. General Legal Principles 
 
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
The requirements for establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel are well-known, and we need not belabor the 
general Strickland jurisprudence here. Hull must establish 
two elements to succeed on his claim: (1) that his counsel's 
performance regarding the competency issue was deficient, 
and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced him by 
producing an unreliable result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687. We have already held that Hull demonstrated thefirst 
prong, see Hull I, 932 F.2d at 168-69, and we see no reason 
to revisit that holding here. We thus confine our discussion 
to the issue of prejudice. 
 
Before considering whether the deficient performance of 
Hull's trial counsel was prejudicial, we will briefly outline 
the relevant law regarding competency to stand trial. We do 
so not because we are deciding the underlying issue of 
whether Hull was competent to stand trial in 1979, but 
because the issue of prejudice is necessarily bound up in 
the law of competency: Whether Hull was prejudiced by his 
counsel's failure to cross-examine the government's single 
witness or to present any evidence of his possible 
incompetence is largely a function of whether Hull was in 
fact incompetent at the time. See, e.g., Eddmonds v. Peters, 
93 F.3d 1307, 1317 (7th Cir. 1996) (framing the issue in a 
similar case as whether "there is a reasonable probability 
that [petitioner] was not fit [to stand trial], calling into 
question the integrity of the adversarial process"), cert. 
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denied, 520 U.S. 1172 (1997); Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 
281, 282 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that a petitioner would 
satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong "only if he demonstrates 
that there is a reasonable probability that but for[his 
counsel's] failure to seek a competency hearing, he would 
have been found incompetent to stand trial" (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 
Regardless of Hull's guilt or innocence, his constitutional 
right to effective counsel would be violated if he were 
convicted of first-degree murder when there was a 
reasonable probability that he was incompetent to stand 
trial. We reiterate also that, under the recent amendments 
to S 2254, we are not undertaking simply an independent 
analysis of this question. Rather, when a habeas petitioner 
presents a claim that has been "adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings," 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), the writ 
should not be granted "unless the state court decision, 
evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an 
outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing 
Supreme Court precedent." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890. 
 
2. Competence to Stand Trial 
 
The basic rule for competency to stand trial is that a 
defendant must (1) have "sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding" and (2) possess "a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per 
curiam) (internal quotation omitted); see also Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (holding that failure to 
provide adequate procedures to ensure that the Dusky test 
is met deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a 
fair trial). 
 
Following Dusky and Robinson, the Supreme Court held 
in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), that a habeas 
petitioner's due process rights had been violated when a 
state court failed to determine his competency, 
notwithstanding his suicide attempt during trial, his wife's 
testimony at trial regarding his strange behavior, and a 
pretrial psychiatric evaluation that contained equivocal 
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evidence of incompetence. See id. at 175-80. A defendant 
presenting similar evidence of incompetency would 
presumably be prejudiced by either the trial court's failure 
to grant a competency hearing or his counsel's failure to 
request one. 
 
Moreover, a defendant's right to be tried only when 
competent would presumably be violated if his counsel's 
conduct at a competency hearing was the virtual equivalent 
of failing to request a competency hearing in a case in 
which the indications of incompetency were as strong as 
they were in Drope. See also United States ex rel. McGough 
v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1975) (relying on 
Drope and Robinson to hold that a petitioner was 
improperly denied "the opportunity to interrogate and 
cross-examine the psychiatrists" who had found him 
competent to stand trial, given that they reported his 
history of commitment in a state hospital "as a result of 
bizarre activities at his home," and his " `obsessive thinking 
and antisocial forms of behavior' "). Although the Superior 
Court did not cite any of these cases, this was the state of 
the law at the time of its 1988 decision denying Hull's state 
post-conviction petition, as well as at the time of the 1979 
competency hearing.6 
 
D. The Facts Regarding Hull's Incompetence  
 
We emphasize that our task is not to determine whether 
there is a reasonable probability that Hull would not have 
been convicted, absent his counsel's errors. Rather, we are 
assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that he 
would have been found incompetent to stand trial if not for 
the deficient performance of his attorney. Therefore, it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In 1983, when the Supreme Court overturned a court of appeals' grant 
of habeas relief in a competency case, it noted that"[t]here is no dispute 
as to the proper legal standard to be applied for determining the 
correctness of the trial court's actions" regarding the petitioner's 
competency. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 116 (1983) (per curiam) 
(citing Robinson and Drope). Therefore, at the time of the Superior 
Court's decision on Hull's ineffective-assistance claim, Robinson and 
Drope remained the leading cases interpreting the requirements for 
competency to stand trial. 
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important to outline the relevant facts available to Hull's 
counsel at the time of his competency hearing. See Buehl v. 
Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.) ("It isfirmly 
established that a court must consider the strength of the 
evidence in deciding whether the Strickland prejudice prong 
has been satisfied."), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2418 
(1999). 
 
1. The Medical Evaluations of Hull 
 
In 1975, shortly after his arrest, Hull was found 
incompetent to stand trial. He was committed to Farview 
State Hospital, and given an initial medical diagnosis of 
borderline mental retardation and schizophrenia (chronic, 
undifferentiated type). In the first medical evaluation in the 
record, which occurred in March 1976, almost a year after 
Hull was committed to Farview, Dr. B.J. Willis reported: 
 
       The staff was of the opinion that this patient continues 
       to show clear signs of a disabling and dangerous 
       mental condition that makes him a considerable risk. 
       The staff was of the opinion that the patient is not now 
       competent to stand trial and that he should be 
       retained in the hospital for further treatment. It was 
       the opinion of the staff that only the firm control and 
       structure of this institution keeps the patient's 
       behavior within bounds. 
 
App. at 426. 
 
Hull was evaluated again approximately five months 
later, on August 4, 1976, by Dr. Arthur D. Boxer. Dr. Boxer 
found that Hull still was not competent to go to trial. See 
id. at 427. Five months later, on January 12, 1977, Hull 
was evaluated by nine Farview staff members. Reporting on 
their evaluation, Dr. John P. Lesniak concluded that Hull 
"cannot participate in his own defense," that he was 
"potentially dangerous," and that he "still[was] not 
competent to stand trial." Id. at 428. Later that month, Dr. 
Donald N. Twaddell concluded that Hull "is hardly in a 
position to be considered competent to stand trial, to 
consult adequately with counsel, or to testify in his own 
defense." Id. at 429. Dr. Twaddell described Hull as 
"frequently and quite actively hallucinatory and disturbed 
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in both the auditory and visual areas with morbid thoughts 
of death." Id. 
 
Five staff members evaluated Hull in May 1977, and 
concluded that Hull, "although improved, continues to be 
incompetent to stand trial at this time." Id. at 432. On 
February 15, 1978, Dr. Lawrence Chang reported: 
 
       History indicates that [Hull] gives a picture of a mental 
       defective who has been unable to read or write. He 
       went as far as only the fourth grade at the age of 15. 
       . . . He remains to be psychotic throughout his 
       hospitalization here with the repeated episode of 
       hearing voices telling him to kill someone and that 
       God's voice tells him not to do harm to anyone . . .. 
       His inability to comprehend the nature of his act is a 
       product and manifestation of his mental illness and 
       mental retardation. Therefore, he is not considered to 
       be mentally competent to stand trial at this time. It is 
       also further recommended that due to his both 
       homicidal and suicidal tendencies, he should continue 
       to be in a setting of maximum security for his own 
       protection and of others. 
 
Id. at 433. Dr. Chang evaluated Hull four more times 
during 1978, in April, June, August, and October. See id. 
at 434-37. Each time he concluded that Hull remained 
incompetent to stand trial due to "his chronic mental 
illness and limited mental capacity." Id. at 437. In 
November 1978, Dr. J. Michael Shovlin suggested that Hull 
might be having "a psychotic depressive reaction" to 
Lithium Therapy, and concluded that Hull was still 
incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 438. Dr. Chang evaluated 
Hull again in January 1979 and found his condition 
unchanged, noting that "he has been undergoing numerous 
psychotropic drug therapies, without noticeable 
improvement," since his admission to Farview. Id. at 439. 
 
On April 9, 1979, less than two weeks before the court- 
appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Stamey, evaluated Hull (and 
later testified that he was competent to stand trial), Dr. 
Kenneth Detrick reported that Hull's condition "does not 
seem to be appreciably different from any of the other 
examinations." Id. at 440. He concluded that "his mental 
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incapacity continues to be so severe that he remains 
incompetent to stand trial for his crime and should 
continue at Farview State Hospital for further treatment." 
Id. 
 
On April 20, 1979, at the request of the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas, Dr. Stamey evaluated Hull, and on 
May 4, 1979, the doctor sent his report to the court. In his 
report, Dr. Stamey noted that Hull's "thoughts were logical 
and coherent and goal directed, and somewhat forceful." Id. 
at 443. He also found Hull's affect "appropriate, but 
shallow." Id. Dr. Stamey did not find Hull to be suicidal. 
See id. He reported that Hull had "some [insight], but not 
much," and that Hull was "a relatively simple soul, not a 
deep thinker or feeler." Id. at 444. Dr. Stamey found that 
Hull's judgment was "good within his intellectual limits," 
but that "under increased stress it might break down." Id. 
Although Hull's schizophrenia appeared to Dr. Stamey to be 
"in a degree of remission" at that time, he found the 
remission "fragile," and noted that Hull "has very little in 
the way of coping mechanisms, still harbors a good bit of 
suspicion, and is very defensive in many areas." Id. at 445. 
 
In conclusion, Dr. Stamey opined that Hull was 
"competent to stand trial and probably would remain so 
throughout the trial if it is not overly stressful." Id. He 
thought it "worth a try," though he cautioned that Hull 
should be watched closely for "signs of regressing." Id. 
Specifically regarding the two requirements of competency, 
Dr. Stamey noted that Hull had "some intellectual and 
emotional understanding of the charges, what might 
happen to him because of them, and what the alternatives 
are," and that Hull "could help his lawyer within the limits 
of his intelligence." Id. However, he qualified his opinion by 
noting that Hull "could regress very quickly and become 
incompetent" under even a small amount of stress. Id. 
 
On May 3, 1979, Hull was evaluated again, and found 
incompetent to stand trial by Farview staff. See id. at 446- 
53. In the final medical evaluation prior to the competency 
hearing, on July 23, 1979, Dr. Norman E. Wenger expressly 
disagreed with Dr. Stamey's conclusion regarding Hull's 
competency to stand trial, and recommended that Hull 
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"receive another period of in-patient, psychiatric 
hospitalization at this facility." Id. at 454. 
 
Following the court's adjudication of Hull as competent to 
stand trial on July 31, 1979, see infra Part IV.D.2, and 
Hull's general guilty plea on August 3, 1979, his trial 
counsel requested (and the court apparently ordered) a 
psychiatric evaluation of Hull in preparation for the degree- 
of-guilt hearing. As a result, on August 15, 1979, Dr. 
Robert L. Sadoff evaluated Hull. The focus of Dr. Sadoff 's 
evaluation appears to have been on Hull's state of mind at 
the time of the crime, not at the time of the competency 
hearing. See App. at 456-60. Dr. Sadoff concluded that Hull 
had acted with diminished mental capacity at the time of 
the shooting, and closed his report with these words: 
 
        Whatever the final determination by the court about 
       the degree of homicide, it is my strong recommendation 
       that Mr. Hull be treated intensively in a hospital setting 
       for a prolonged period of time. The combination of his 
       illness, borderline mental retardation and poor impulse 
       control, with alcoholism is a potentially explosive and 
       violent combination which requires security measures 
       as well as medication and a therapeutic environment. 
       At one level Mr. Hull is aware of the situation in which 
       he is involved to the point that he wants to be put to 
       death by the State for what he says he has done. He 
       says, "I don't deserve to live." On the other hand, he 
       wants to live and wants to engage in constructive 
       rehabilitative efforts. However, these efforts will be 
       long-term and his recovery will be slow and the 
       remission is fragile at the present time. Moderate 
       degrees of stress will be sufficient to cause further 
       decompensation and deterioration in Mr. Hull's 
       condition. He will require continued medication as well 
       as security treatment. 
 
Id. at 460-61. 
 
As for Hull's then-current state of mind, Dr. Sadoff noted 
that Hull "believes that he is competent" and"believes that 
he should be found guilty and should be given the death 
penalty for what he did." Id. at 455. Dr. Sadoff concluded 
that "Hull is mentally competent to proceed in this legal 
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situation. He understands the nature and consequences of 
his legal condition and can work with counsel in preparing 
a rational defense." Id. at 459. At this point, however, Hull 
had already been adjudicated competent (as his counsel 
had requested, see id. at 424), and his guilty plea to 
murder had been accepted. 
 
2. The Competency Hearing 
 
The competency hearing was held on July 31, 1979. 
Despite the 1975 finding that Hull was incompetent, and 
the veritable phalanx of medical reports that Hull remained 
incompetent, the entire hearing took less than an hour and 
is reproduced in only four pages of transcript. See id. at 
421-24. As noted above, only one witness, Dr. Stamey, 
testified. Because of its central importance in this case, we 
include in the margin the entire transcript from the 
competency hearing.7 
 
(Text continued on page 34) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The competency hearing began with the government calling Dr. 
Stamey to the stand: 
 
       BY MR. WALKER [the District Attorney]: 
 
        Q Dr. Stamey, what is your occupation? 
 
        A I am a physician, psychiatrist. 
 
        Q Are you associated with any hospital? 
 
        A A senior vice president and medical director of the Geisinger 
       Medical Center in Danville. 
 
        Q Dr. Stamey, where did you do your undergraduate work? 
 
        A At George Washington University. 
 
        Q Where did you do your medical training? 
 
        A Also at George Washington University. 
 
          MR. MARTIN [Hull's trial counsel]: Your Honor, we will 
       stipulate to Dr. Stamey as being a psychiatrist. 
 
          THE COURT: Very well. 
 
       BY MR. WALKER: 
 
        Q Dr. Stamey, going back to April 20, 1979, did you have 
       occasion to evaluate Larry Gene Hull? 
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        A Yes, sir. 
 
        Q Is Larry here in the courtroom today? 
 
        A Yes. 
 
        Q Where is he seated? 
 
        A Right there (indicating.) 
 
        Q Where was that evaluation at? 
 
        A At the Farview State Hospital in Waymart. 
 
        Q From your evaluation of Mr. Hull on that date, were you able 
       to form an opinion as to whether Mr. Hull would be able to 
       understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him? 
 
        A Yes, sir. 
 
        Q What is that opinion? 
 
        A I feel that he could. 
 
        Q What is your opinion as to whether or not Mr. Hull would be 
       able to participate and assist in his defense? 
 
        A At that time I felt that he could do so. 
 
          MR. WALKER: I have no further questions. 
 
          THE COURT: Cross examine. 
 
          MR. MARTIN: We have no questions, Your Ho nor. 
 
          THE COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Hull, t hat your attorney 
       has the right to cross examine the doctor to find out what it was 
       that formed the basis of the doctor's opinion as he has reported 
it. 
       Do you understand that? 
 
          THE WITNESS [Hull]: Yes, I do. 
 
          THE COURT: And understanding that, had yo u told your 
       attorney that you do not request him to cross examine the witness? 
 
          THE WITNESS: Yes. 
 
          THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. You may be 
       seated. 
 
          MR. WALKER: Your Honor, that is all that we have for the 
       Commonwealth's case. 
 
                                33 
  
At the hearing, the government asked Dr. Stamey only 
two substantive questions: Whether he believed "Hull would 
be able to understand the nature or object of the 
proceedings against him," id. at 422, and whether "Hull 
would be able to participate and assist in his defense," id. 
at 423. To the first question, Dr. Stamey answered, "I feel 
that he could." Id. In response to the second question, 
regarding Hull's assisting in his defense, Dr. Stamey 
apparently referred to his evaluation of Hull approximately 
three months earlier: "At that time I felt that he could do 
so." Id. Dr. Stamey did not elaborate on either answer, and 
was asked no further questions by the district attorney. 
Hull's counsel, when asked by the court to cross-examine 
Dr. Stamey, responded, "We have no questions, Your 
Honor." Id. 
 
The Commonwealth presented no other evidence of Hull's 
competence. There is also no indication in the record that 
the government introduced Dr. Stamey's report into 
evidence. When the government stated that it had no 
additional evidence or witnesses to present, the court asked 
Hull's counsel if he had any evidence to present. He 
responded, "No, we have none." Id. At this point, the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
          THE COURT: Do you have any evidence to pr esent, Mr. Martin? 
 
          MR. MARTIN: No, we have none. 
 
          THE COURT: All right, we will make an ord er. Mr. Martin, is 
       there any objection to our making an order finding Mr. Hull 
       competent to stand trial? 
 
          MR. MARTIN: No objection, Your Honor. In fact, we have agreed 
       to it. 
 
          THE COURT: You request it? 
 
          MR. MARTIN: Yes. 
 
App. at 421-24. 
 
The record reflects that the court then entered an order. Following a 
sidebar discussion off the record, the court set a trial date of September 
10, 1979, and remanded Hull to Franklin County Prison pending trial. 
See id. at 424. 
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entered an order finding Hull competent to stand trial, 
which Hull's counsel expressly "agreed to." Id. at 424. 
 
E. Prejudice to Hull 
 
Initially, we reiterate that under AEDPA and Matteo, we 
must look at the last state court decision on the merits of 
a petitioner's claim to determine if that decision,"evaluated 
objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that 
cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme 
Court precedent." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890. The last state 
court decision on the merits of Hull's ineffective-assistance 
claim is the Superior Court's 1988 decision. That decision, 
"evaluated objectively and on the merits," reveals little 
discussion of the issue before us--prejudice under 
Strickland. The only aspect of the court's opinion that 
appears to refer to this issue is its determination that the 
colloquy at Hull's guilty plea on August 3, 1979, 
demonstrated his "ability to recount in detail his actions 
and emotions at the time of the murder," Commonwealth v. 
Hull, No. 215 Harr. 1988, slip op. at 3-4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 30, 1988), which established both his ability to assist 
his counsel and his understanding of the proceedings 
against him, see id. at 4.8 
 
Under Strickland, a petitioner alleging prejudice from his 
counsel's deficient performance "must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Common Pleas Court's decision on this issue, included in its 
opinion and order of February 22, 1988, contains a similar analysis. See 
Commonwealth v. Hull, Crim. No. 101-1975, slip op. at 9 (Pa. C.P. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 1988) ("We have independently reviewed defendant's testimony 
at the guilty plea proceeding . . ., and note that defendant testified in 
a 
cogent, coherent manner, giving no indication whatever of incompetency 
at the time of such testimony."). We note incidentally that the Common 
Pleas Court assumed--incorrectly in our view--that the burden remained 
on Hull to rebut the presumption of competence with clear-and- 
convincing evidence, despite the earlier adjudication that found him 
incompetent to stand trial. See id. at 9-10; cf. supra Part I.A. 
 
                                35 
  
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. This standard 
"is not a stringent one." Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 
(1986)). It is less demanding than the preponderance 
standard. See id. Therefore, to prove that he was prejudiced 
by his counsel's performance, Hull need not demonstrate 
that he definitely was incompetent in 1979. Rather, he 
must only establish that there was a reasonable probability 
that he was. 
 
Applying this standard from Strickland and our 
interpretation of S 2254(d)(1) from Matteo, we conclude that 
it was objectively unreasonable for the Superior Court to 
implicitly find that there was no "reasonable probability" 
that the outcome of Hull's competency hearing would have 
been different if not for his counsel's failure to cross- 
examine Dr. Stamey or to present evidence in support of 
Hull's incompetence. 
 
Supreme Court precedent as of 1988 clearly required 
more of a state court than the summary conclusion that 
the Superior Court drew from the plea colloquy. 9 Pate v. 
Robinson, decided more than a decade before Hull's 
competency hearing, required states to provide adequate 
procedures to ensure that only competent defendants were 
tried (and convicted). Drope v. Missouri, also decided before 
the competency hearing and well before the Superior 
Court's 1988 decision, held that a habeas petitioner's due 
process rights were violated when a state court did not 
consider evidence of his incompetence, even though his 
incompetence was far from certain. Indeed, in 1975, we 
relied on these two cases in McGough to find that a habeas 
petitioner's constitutional rights were violated when he was 
not given the opportunity to cross-examine psychiatrists 
who deemed him competent to stand trial--one of the bases 
on which we have found that Hull's trial counsel was 
deficient. See Hull I, 932 F.2d at 168; cf. Matteo, 171 F.3d 
at 890 ("[F]ederal habeas courts are [not] precluded from 
considering the decisions of the inferior federal courts when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that both Strickland and Whiteside, as well as the competency 
cases discussed supra Part IV.C.2, were decided before the Superior 
Court's consideration of Hull's ineffective-assistance claim in 1988. 
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evaluating whether the state court's application of the law 
was reasonable."). 
 
These cases unequivocally provide that a criminal 
defendant is entitled to adequate procedures, including the 
opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine 
government witnesses, when his competency is at issue. 
When a defendant has not only already been found 
incompetent to stand trial, as Hull was before the 1979 
competency hearing, but when numerous evaluations of his 
mental condition indicate that he remains incompetent, his 
competency to stand trial must be carefully considered by 
the court before a trial may be held or a guilty judgment 
entered. Under these circumstances, when a defendant's 
own attorney fails to effectively use the procedures to 
determine competency that are mandated by Supreme 
Court precedent, we believe that the prejudice to the 
possibly still-incompetent defendant is manifest. 
 
The state courts did not discuss at length the evidence 
regarding Hull's competence. The District Court did outline 
Dr. Stamey's findings, and observed that the many doctors 
who found Hull incompetent "addressed Hull's past 
condition and not his condition as of the date of the 
hearing." Hull v. Freeman, Civ. No. 89-0681, slip op. at 14- 
15 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1991). However, four of the 
evaluations occurred in 1979, within six months of the 
competency hearing, and fifteen different evaluations 
between 1976 and 1979 found Hull incompetent while only 
the single evaluation of Dr. Stamey resulted in afinding of 
competency. Dr. Stamey's opinion, moreover, was not based 
on Hull's condition on the date of the hearing, but on his 
evaluation of Hull more than three months earlier. Even a 
short, simple cross-examination could have highlighted this 
fact, as well as Dr. Stamey's own concessions that Hull 
"could regress very quickly and become incompetent," and 
that his putative remission was "fragile" (and might have 
already shattered in the three months since the doctor's 
observation of Hull). 
 
The District Court acknowledged that "Dr. Stamey's 
written report was not admitted into evidence at the 
competency hearing," id. at 5, though it discussed the 
report at length before rejecting Hull's claim, see id. at 11- 
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13. However, when determining whether there is a 
"reasonable probability" that the Common Pleas Court 
would have reached a different conclusion in the absence of 
counsel's inadequate performance, we should not assume 
that it considered Dr. Stamey's report in reaching its actual 
conclusion. Cf. Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 669 (3d Cir. 
1998) ("[W]e cannot go beyond the record to refute 
[petitioner's] assertion of prejudice."). In fact, the record 
does not reveal that the Common Pleas Court considered 
any of the reports on Hull's competency and arguably it 
would have had no reason to do so once Hull's counsel 
"agreed" at the competency hearing that Hull was 
competent to stand trial. We note, however, that Hull was 
found incompetent on three different occasions in mid- 
1979, including twice after Dr. Stamey's evaluation and 
before the competency hearing. 
 
It is not certain that the state court would have found 
Hull incompetent on the basis of this evidence from the 
mid-1979 evaluations (or even on the basis of the twelve 
previous evaluations that found him incompetent, and the 
detailed descriptions of his psychosis and mental illness in 
all of the evaluations). But we have no troublefinding that 
there is a reasonable probability that the court would have 
determined that Hull had not regained his competence to 
stand trial if this evidence had been presented by Hull's 
counsel, and if Dr. Stamey had been pressed even slightly 
on the qualified and equivocal nature of his report's 
conclusions. 
 
At the juncture of the dual constitutional requirements of 
effective assistance of counsel and a defendant's 
competency, the Supreme Court has implied that defense 
counsel has a special role in effectively ensuring that a 
client is competent to stand trial. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 
177 n.13 ("Although we do not, of course, suggest that 
courts must accept without question a lawyer's 
representations concerning the competence of his client, an 
expressed doubt in that regard by one with `the closest 
contact with the defendant,' is unquestionably a factor 
which should be considered." (citations omitted)). Defense 
counsel's special role arises not only from the typical 
attorney-client relationship, but from the very fact that the 
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defendant may be unable to appreciate the proceedings or 
to assist his attorney (or to make an intelligent decision on 
challenging his competency). Cf. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 384 
("[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be 
incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently`waive' his 
right to have the court determine his capacity to stand 
trial."). Hull would clearly appear to have been prejudiced 
by his counsel's failure to "express[ ] doubt" regarding his 
competency by cross-examining the government's single 
witness or presenting any of the large body of evidence in 
support of Hull's incompetence to stand trial. 
 
In Strickland, the Court noted that the "benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
We think it abundantly clear that counsel's conduct at the 
competency hearing in this case, given the demonstrated 
and overwhelming evidence of Hull's incompetence, 
"undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process" of a competency hearing, which was required (in 
1979) by Supreme Court precedent and the Due Process 
Clause, so that we cannot say that a just result--i.e., the 
conviction of a competent and guilty defendant--occurred. 
This certainly is not a case in which we can say that 
prejudice did not result from counsel's failure to act 
because counsel took sufficient alternative steps to ensure 
that defendant was adequately represented. Cf. Hess v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that a defendant suffered no prejudice from counsel's 
failure to call certain alibi witnesses because his counsel 
had "presented a plausible, if ultimately unsuccessful, alibi 
defense" through other witnesses). 
 
Finally, we note that prejudice to a defendant is 
presumed when his counsel's performance is so deficient as 
to effectively constitute a denial of the right to counsel. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In this case, despite the strong 
evidence of Hull's incompetence (evidence that could 
presumably be presented only by counsel), Hull's trial 
counsel "agreed" at the conclusion of the competency 
hearing that Hull was competent to stand trial. This is 
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essentially tantamount to "constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether[, which] is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice." Id. The order of the 
District Court must therefore be reversed and the case 
remanded with instructions to grant the writ. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
When Hull was first granted the writ by the district court 
in 1990, that court appeared to believe that the state court 
should readjudicate Hull's competency to stand trial as of 
1979, effectively redoing the flawed competency hearing. 
However, in Hull I, we explained that if Hull's ineffective- 
assistance claim was not procedurally defaulted and if he 
proved prejudice from his counsel's deficient performance, 
the writ should be granted conditioned on his being retried 
--not conditioned on his competency in 1979 being 
readjudicated. We believe this remains the proper 
disposition of Hull's successful habeas petition. 
 
The state may retry Hull if it chooses, and the writ will be 
granted conditioned on his retrial within 120 days. Because 
he was found incompetent to stand trial at his last valid 
competency hearing (in 1975), the state must first establish 
that Hull has presently regained his competency to stand 
trial before retrying him. At this point, his actual 
competency as of 1979 is irrelevant to any criminal 
proceedings against him. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403 
(remanding to the trial court "for a new hearing to ascertain 
petitioner's present competency to stand trial," given "the 
. . . difficulties of retrospectively determining the 
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago"); see 
also Drope, 420 U.S. at 183 (same, when competency 
hearing was held six years before writ was granted); 
Robinson, 383 U.S. at 387 (same). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed and the case remanded for the 
granting of a writ of habeas corpus conditioned on Hull's 
being retried within 120 days, with the understanding that, 
if Hull cannot be tried within this period because he is 
found incompetent to stand trial, the state has at its 
disposal procedures for treating Hull, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
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50, SS 7401-7407 (West Supp. 1999), and it may retry him 
within 120 days of his regaining his competency to stand 
trial should he do so. 
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